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1. Introduction 
In 1911, Britain introduced the first publicly financed unemployment 
insurance (UI) system. Since then, UI programs of one sort or another have become 
key policy tools in virtually all industrial economies. The primary goal of these 
programs is to provide consumption smoothing over periods of employment and 
unemployment.
1 The drawback of UI programs stems from the moral hazard effect. 
Indeed, the main line of research on the optimal design of UI benefits has focused on 
issues of the trade-off between consumption smoothing and moral hazard [see, for 
instance, Karni (1999), for a broad survey].  
The main insight provided by the early models that appeared in the late 70's 
[Baily (1978), Flemming (1978) and Shavell and Weiss (1979)] was the desirability 
of a declining schedule, that is, benefits should decline over the spell of 
unemployment so as to mitigate the moral hazard effect.
2 These early models have 
been extended in several directions. Two such examples are Hopenhayn and Nicolini 
(1997) who extended the set of fiscal instruments by allowing for a wage tax after re-
employment; and Fredrikson and Holmlund (2001), that consider a general 
equilibrium framework with endogenous wage determination (through bargaining 
between firms and workers). Notably, these models preserve the declining pattern 
featured by the early contributions.
3 
                                            
1  UI programs also serve to enhance the efficiency of job search and matching in the labor market. 
2 A declining time profile is fairly prevalent. Typically, UI benefits are offered for a limited duration 
and then replaced by lower benefits categorized as social or income assistance (the latter is often means 
tested to further mitigate the moral hazard issue). According to OECD (2004) UI duration in OECD 
countries ranges between 6 and 60 months (Belgium being an exception with an unlimited duration in 
some cases).  
3 The literature emphasized the role of a declining UI schedule as a means to mitigate the tradeoff 
between consumption smoothing and moral hazard. Another strand in the literature demonstrates how a 
declining schedule can mitigate a different form of tradeoff between sorting (providing workers with 
incentives to wait for jobs that are more suitable) and unemployment [see Cremer, Merchand and 
Pestieu (1996) and, more recently, Blumkin, Hadar and Yashiv (2005)].    3
A common assumption in the literature on optimal UI programs is the 
homogeneity of workers. Relaxing this assumption, that is assuming heterogeneous 
workers may have several important implications. First, with heterogeneous agents, 
there is no longer one Pareto-efficient UI program; but there will rather be many 
Pareto-efficient UI programs. Second, a UI program need no longer consist of a single 
schedule, but may well consist of several time-dependent schedules which are 
incentive compatible. For instance, a UI program may offer one schedule with 
benefits rising over time and another one with benefits diminishing over time, and 
with individuals self-selecting between them. 
  Naturally, there may be many dimensions of heterogeneity one may consider. 
Wage rates or job opportunities are clearly among them. However, individuals with 
the same wage rate (or job opportunities) may still have different personal attributes 
that affect their re-employment prospects. These attributes include, inert-alia, health, 
education, marital status and parenthood and social networking. Typically, many of 
these attributes are difficult and often very costly to observe. We refer to this broad 
class of attributes as search ability.
4 In this paper, we focus on this dimension of 
heterogeneity and study the time profile of UI benefits. Indeed, this kind of 
heterogeneity lends itself to the study of the time profile of UI benefits, because other 
dimensions of heterogeneity, such as wage heterogeneity, may be addressed by wage-
dependent UI or other means.  
  Allowing for individuals to differ in their search ability, we show that there 
may well exist Pareto-efficient programs that consist of schedules that offer rising 
benefits over time. In particular, we show that Pareto-efficient UI programs that favor 
individuals with low search ability offer the latter schedules with rising benefits over 
                                            
4  For an empirical evidence for the existence of this dimension of heterogeneity, see, for instance, 
Petrongolo (2001).   4
time, whereas individuals with high search ability are still offered schedules with 
declining benefits over time (as suggested by the literature).
5 
  The organization of the paper will be as follows. In the following section we 
introduce the model. In section 3 we derive the properties of the optimal UI system. 
We conclude in section 4.  
 
2. The  Model 
    We construct a simple bare-bone framework with just the key ingredients 
necessary to demonstrate our point. Consider a two-type economy where each 
individual (i=1,2) lives for two periods. We assume a continuum of individuals and 
normalize to unity the number of individuals for each type, with no loss in generality. 
Job search is conducted in the beginning of each period. Each individual engages in 
search for a job which offers her (for each working period) a wage rate denoted by 
w>0. If the individual finds a job in the beginning of the first period of life, she works 
both in the first and in the second period. Otherwise she engages in a second round of 
search in the beginning of the second period, and provided that she finds a job, she 
works in the second period.  
All individuals share the same instantaneous utility from consumption given 
by  ) (c u , where  0    as    ) ( '    and       as    0 ) ( '   , 0 ' ' , 0 ' → ∞ → ∞ → → < > c c u c c u u u .
6 
  We assume that the probability of finding a job is a function of both the type 
of the individual (her ability), denoted by 
i a , and the search effort exerted, denoted 
                                            
5 Shimer and Werning (2006) analyze the time-profile of UI benefits with heterogeneous workers. They 
focus on wage heterogeneity, whereas we choose to focus on differences in search abilities. Our papers 
also differ in some other aspects: first, we assume that the unemployed are credit-constrained; second, 
there are no lump-sum transfers in our setting; finally and most importantly, we allow for a menu of UI 
schedules. 
6 Note that without being excessively unrealistic, in light of the empirical evidence [see the discussion 
in Saez (2002)] suggesting that labor supply elasticity (conditional on participation) is fairly low, we 
simplify by focusing on the extensive margin (participation choice in the labor market) while ignoring 
the intensive margin (labor-leisure choice), by dropping leisure from the utility function.   5
by  e, measured in utility terms. Specifically, we let  ) ( ) ( e p a e p
i i ⋅ =  denote the 
probability that an individual of type i finds a job, conditional on exerting an effort e, 
where 0    as    ) ( '    and       as    0 ) ( '   , 0 ' ' , 0 ' → ∞ → ∞ → → < > e e p e e p p p . We further 
assume that 0 / )] ( ' / ) ( ' ' [ ≤ − de e p e p d . That is, the marginal effort curve declines at a 
(weakly) falling rate (note the analogy to the non-increasing absolute risk aversion 
feature). The latter assumption seems reasonable, as p(e) is naturally bounded from 
above by unity. The economic implication of the assumption is that the disincentive 
effect of the UI system (diminished search incentives in response to more generous 
benefits and/or higher payroll taxes) would be (weakly) stronger for the high search-
ability individual.
7 It is straightforward to find functional forms for p(e) that satisfy all 
the properties specified above; for instance, the exponential case, given 
by ), exp( 1 ) ( e e p γ − − =  where  0 > γ , used by Hopenhayn and Nicolini (1997), 
amongst others, for numerical analysis. For concreteness, we let a type-2 individual 
be more able in searching for a job ( 0
1 2 > > a a ), that is, for a given search effort, she 
is more likely to find a job. Moreover, other things equal, she faces stronger 
incentives to search (because  e e p e e p ∂ ∂ > ∂ ∂ / ) ( / ) (
1 2  for all e), and hence will exert 
higher search efforts.  
A standard assumption in the UI literature is that search effort is unobserved 
by the government. In our setup we further supplement this assumption by supposing, 
á la Mirrlees (1971) that the individual search ability (type) is also a private 
information, unobserved by the government. 
Suppose that the government offers an UI program of the following form. An 
individual is entitled to UI benefits, denoted by  1 b  and  2 b , during the first and second 
period of unemployment, respectively; and pays a payroll tax, denoted by τ , at any 
                                            
7 The assumption simplifies our analysis but a weaker assumption would suffice for the arguments.   6
working period. We let  ) , , ( 2 1 1 τ b b V
i  denote the maximal level of utility derived by an 
individual of type i faced with the UI system τ , , 2 1 b b . Thus, 
(1)  { } e b V b u e p w u e p b b V
i i i
e
i − + ⋅ − + − ⋅ ⋅ ≡ )] , ( ) ( [ )] ( 1 [ ) ( 2 ) ( max ) , , ( 2 2 1 2 1 1 τ τ τ , 
where   { } e b u e p w u e p b V
i i
e
i − ⋅ − + − ⋅ ≡ ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( max ) , ( 2 2 2 τ τ . 
We denote by  ) , (    and    ) , , ( 2 2 2 1 1 τ τ b e b b e
i i , the optimal choice of efforts in period 
1 and 2, respectively, by type-i individuals. We henceforth omit the arguments of 
2 1    and    e e  for notational simplicity.  
Two remarks are in order. First, we simplify by assuming, with no loss of 
generality, that the individuals have no time preference (that is, the subjective 
discount rate is zero). Second, in order to stay in line with the early literature on the 
optimal design of UI benefits [see, for instance, the seminal contribution of Shavell 
and Weiss (1979)], we make the following assumptions: (i) individuals have no other 
sources of income, (ii) an unemployed individual cannot borrow (or lend); and (iii) 
the consumption good is non-storable.
8  
  We turn next to the derivation of the Pareto-efficient UI programs. As there 
are two types of individuals, the government can possibly offer two schedules, each of 
which chosen by a different type of individual (a separating equilibrium).
9 We denote 
                                            
8 The assumption that agents cannot accumulate assets implies that consumption during unemployment 
spells equals UI benefits. UI arrangement thus plays a dual role by providing both insurance and 
liquidity. Shavell and Weiss (1979) discuss the plausibility of the assumptions that the unemployed 
have no wealth and cannot borrow (the possibility of saving by the unemployed is far less likely even 
when UI benefits decline over time). The former assumption is made to simplify the analysis and can 
be relaxed by assuming a constant exogenous (type independent) source of income. The latter 
assumption seems plausible as the unemployed find it often difficult to borrow due to moral hazard 
issues (a primary reason for government provision of UI benefits). Shavell and Weiss (1979) do discuss 
the case where individuals can save, however, in the absence of moral hazard issues. Ruling out saving 
and borrowing is quite standard in the repeated moral hazard literature. A rare exception is Fudenberg, 
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990); see also the related discussion in Rogerson (1985). For a recent paper 
that considers the optimal UI system while allowing workers to save and borrow freely, see Shimer and 
Werning (2006). 
9  In a recent paper, Luttmer and Zeckhauser (2008) consider a model where individuals are imperfectly 
informed about their types and acquire information about the latter over time. In this case offering a 
menu of schedules can generate welfare gains relative to offering a single schedule which would   7








1 τ b b  the two benefit-tax schedules designed for the low-
ability individual (type 1) and high-ability individual (type 2), respectively. To be 
incentive-compatible, these schedules must satisfy the following self-selection 
constraints (which state that each type has no incentive to mimic the other type): 
(2) ) , , ( ) , , ( 2 1 1 2 1 1
j j j i i i i i b b V b b V τ τ ≥ ;  i j j i ≠ =    ; 2 , 1 ,,   
These schedules must satisfy also a revenue constraint, which by virtue of the law of 
large numbers, requires that expected net revenues are non-negative:
10 
(3)
[ ] [ ] ∑ ∑ ≥ ⋅ − ⋅ − + ⋅ − − ⋅ ⋅ − + ⋅
ii
i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i b e p e p b e p e p e p e p 0 )] ( 1 [ )] ( 1 [ )] ( 1 [ ) ( )] ( 1 [ ) ( 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 τ
 
Note, that we assume just one overall budget constraint; that is, we do not require that 
the expected payments and benefits should be balanced at the individual level (as may 
be common in private but not in public programs, due to the re-distributive feature of 
the latter).   
  The set of Pareto-efficient UI programs consists of the set of pairs of 3-tuples, 








1 τ τ b b b b , which maximize a weighted average of the two utilities: 












1 τ α τ α b b V b b V W ⋅ + ⋅ − ≡ , 
subject to the self-selection constraints in (2) and the revenues constraint in (3), where 
1 0 ≤ ≤α  is the social welfare weight assigned to type-2 individuals. 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
suffice to attain the optimum in the perfect information case. Luttmer and Zeckhauser show, however, 
that in the special two-type case, offering just a single schedule would suffice to attain the optimum. 
Our model differs in that individuals are perfectly informed about their type right from the outset. We 
show that offering two schedules would be optimal. While this might seem to be inconsistent at a first 
blush, it should be noted, that our model could be re-formulated as suggesting only a single schedule.  
10  This specification assumes that the interest rate is zero and that the government has no revenue 
needs.    8
 
3.  Properties of the Pareto-Efficient UI Programs 
  An interesting preliminary question is whether a Pareto-efficient UI program 
must offer two distinct schedules (a separating equilibrium) or just a single schedule 
(a pooling equilibrium). Our first result establishes that a Pareto-efficient UI program 
necessarily involves a separating equilibrium. Formally, 
Lemma: A Pareto-efficient UI program must have a separating equilibrium. 
Proof: See Appendix A. ■ 
  Now, we turn to our main point: under some conditions a Pareto-efficient UI 
program which favors the low-ability individual must offer this individual a schedule 
with rising benefits over time; whereas the high-ability individual is still offered a 
schedule with declining benefits over time.
11 More specifically, two conditions are 
required. First, the social welfare weight (α ) assigned to the high search-ability 
individual (type 2) is small. Second, the search disincentive effect on the low search-
ability individual (type 1) caused by the UI system is rather small. Formally, we 
measure this disincentive effect by the term  ) (  
1
2









1 ) ( b e e p b ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ≡ Δ  
denotes the effect of a small increase in the benefit (
1
2 b ) offered to a type-1 individual 
during her second period of unemployment on her probability to find a job, evaluated 
at the individual optimum. In the exponential case, given by  ), exp( 1 ) ( e e p γ − − =  
where 0 > γ , this would amount to assuming that γ  is sufficiently large. Formally, 
Proposition: Let the weight assigned to the high-ability individual (that is, α ) be 








1 τ b b  constitute a Pareto-efficient UI 
program associated with this α . Suppose further, that the second-period distortion of 
                                            
11  It is worth noting that when UI programs are restricted to a single schedule (pooling equilibrium), 
one can show that Pareto-efficiency would imply that benefits should decline over time.   9









1 b b > . 
Proof: See Appendix A. ■ 
  The rationale for this result is as follows. In general, bearing on the optimal 
tax literature, one would like to reduce the distortion as much as possible for the high-
ability individual [see Sadka (1976)]. In the UI context, reducing the distortion 
amounts to mitigating the moral hazard problem. As the UI literature suggests, this 
can be achieved by offering a schedule with declining benefits over time for the high-
ability individual. A declining schedule for the low-ability individual would also serve 
the purpose of mitigating the moral hazard problem. However, for the low-ability 
individual there is also another consideration. Allowing benefits to rise over time 
enables the government to mitigate the binding incentive constraint of the high-ability 
type (discouraging her from choosing the schedule designed for the low-ability 
individual). The reason for this derives from the fact that the marginal rate of 
substitution between the benefit levels in the two periods is higher for the high-ability 
individual, as she is less likely to remain unemployed in the second period, 
conditional on being unemployed in the first period. By mitigating this constraint, the 
government can raise the utility of the low-ability individual at the expense of the 
high-ability individual, which is desirable when α  is sufficiently small. Thus, when 
the distortion caused by a rising schedule is small enough, the "re-distribution" motive 
dominates, and it is Pareto-efficient to offer the low-ability individual a schedule with 
rising benefits over time.
12 
                                            
12   This idea of searching for additional policy tools aimed at mitigating incentive compatibility 
constraints in order to enhance welfare lies at the core of the second-best policy design literature that 
followed the seminal works of Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) and Mirrlees (1971). For instance, 
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) show that taxing the returns to saving can mitigate the incentive 
compatibility constraint, thereby improving the disability insurance system.   10
4. Conclusions 
  The primary goal of UI programs is to provide a tool for consumption 
smoothing over periods of employment and unemployment. A key result in the 
literature suggests that so as to mitigate the inherent moral hazard effects inherent to 
such programs, due to the asymmetry in information, benefits should decline over 
time. Indeed, UI programs in most industrial countries follow this pattern. 
  In this paper, we re-examine this key result in the context of heterogeneous 
individuals. We suggest that Pareto-efficient UI programs generally offer a variety of 
benefit-contribution schedules (separating equilibria). More importantly, Pareto-
efficient UI programs which favor the low search-ability workers may offer them 
schedules with rising benefits over time. 
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Appendix A: Proofs 
Proof of the Lemma 
We first turn to establish a simple claim which will be used in the proof. For this 
purpose we introduce a new piece of notation: we denote by  2 2 2 2) ( b e e p b
i i i i ∂ ∂ ⋅ ∂ ∂ ≡ Δ  
the effect of a small increase in the benefit ( 2 b ) offered to a type-i individual during 
her second period of unemployment on her probability to find a job, evaluated at the 
individual optimal choice.  
Claim:  ). ( ) ( 2
2
2
1 b b Δ ≥ Δ  
Proof of the Claim: The first order condition for the type-i individual optimization 
(with respect to search effort in the second period) implies:  
(A1) 0 1 )] ( ) ( [ ) ( ' 2 2 = − − − ⋅ ⋅ b u w u e p a
i i τ .  
Fully differentiating the expression in (A1) with respect to 
i e2, employing (A1) and re-
arranging yields: 
(A2) )]. ( ' ' / ) ( ' [ )] ( ) ( /[ ) ( ' ) ( 2 2 2 2 2
i i i e p e p b u w u b u b ⋅ − − = Δ τ  




2 e e > , as 
1 2 a a > . The 
claim follow then by virtue of our assumption that  0 / )] ( ' / ) ( ' ' [ ≤ − de e p e p d . ■ 
We turn next to prove the lemma. The proof will be by way of contradiction. Let the 
optimal solution be a pooling equilibrium. Denote the optimal schedule by  ) , , ( 2 1 τ b b . 
Differentiating the indirect utility in (1) with respect to  1 b  and  2 b , employing the 
envelope theorem, implies that the marginal rate of substitution between the two 
benefit levels (fixing the payroll tax, τ ) is given by: 









= . By   14
virtue of the properties of the probability function,  ) (e p
i , ) ( ) (
1 2 e p e p > , hence, 
1 2 MRS MRS > . Now, suppose that the government offers a second schedule 
( τ , ' , ' 2 1 b b ), where:  2 2 2 1 1 1 ' , ' ε ε + = + = b b b b ,  2 1 0 ε ε > > ,  2 1   and   ε ε are small and 
2
1 2 / MRS = − ε ε . That is we offer a second schedule which lies on the indifference 
curve of the high-ability type going through the original schedule by moving (slightly) 
along her indifference curve in the southeast direction (see Figure 1 in the Appendix 
B). By construction, the high-ability individual (type 2) will be indifferent between 
the two schedules, whereas the low-ability individual (type 1) will strictly prefer the 
original (presumably optimal) schedule to the new schedule, as her indifference curve 
is flatter than that of the high-ability type. Thus, the incentive constraints are still 
satisfied. Moreover, as we decrease the benefit to which the high-ability individual is 
entitled during the second period, she will increase her search effort (and hence her 
chances to find a job) during this period. By construction of the new schedule, the 
effort exerted during the first period remains the same. Differentiating the revenue 
constraint in (3), denoting by  ) , ( 2 1 ε ε Ω  the total effect of introducing the new 
schedule on the net tax revenues, it follows that: 
(A3)
[] , ] 1 ) ( ' / ) ( ' [ )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [
























− ⋅ − + + ⋅ Δ ⋅ − ⋅ =
− ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ − + ⋅ Δ ⋅ − ⋅ = Ω
b u b u e p b b e p
e p e p e p b b e p
τ ε
ε ε τ ε ε ε
 
where the equality follows by substituting the term 
2
2 / MRS ε −  for  1 ε .  
A necessary condition for the original schedule to be Pareto-efficient is that 
0 ) , ( 2 1 ≤ Ω ε ε . Otherwise, offering the new schedule will maintain the incentive 
constraints, attain the same level of utility (for both types) as in the original schedules, 
but result in a positive fiscal surplus. This surplus can be utilized to attain a Pareto   15
improvement, by raising the level of utility at all states for both types by the same 
arbitrarily small amount, which does not change the search and the mimicking 
incentives.  This necessary condition implies in particular that:  





2 ≥ − ⋅ − + + ⋅ Δ b u b u e p b b τ . 
Now, suppose that the government is offering an alternative schedule (in addition to 
the original presumably Pareto-efficient schedule). Denote this new schedule by 
( τ , ' ' , ' ' 2 1 b b ), where  2 2 2 1 1 1 ' ' , ' ' ε ε + = + = b b b b ,  1 2 0 ε ε > > ,  2 1   and   ε ε are small and 
1
1 2 / MRS = − ε ε . This time the new schedule lies on the indifference curve of the 
low-ability type going through the original schedule, by moving along her curve in the 
north-west direction (see Figure 2 in Appendix B). By construction, the low-ability 
individual (type 1) will be indifferent between the two schedules, whereas the high-
ability individual (type 2) will strictly prefer the original (presumably optimal) 
schedule to the new one, as her indifference curve is steeper than that of the low-
ability type. Thus, the two incentive constraints are satisfied. Moreover, as we 
increase the benefit to which the low-ability individual is entitled during the second 
period, she will decrease her search effort (and hence her chances to find a job) during 
this period. By construction of the new schedule, the effort exerted during the first 
period remains the same. Differentiating the revenue constraint in (3), denoting by 
) , ( 2 1 ε ε Ψ  the total effect of introducing the new schedule on the net tax revenues, it 
follows that: 
(A5)
[] , ] 1 ) ( ' / ) ( ' [ )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [
























− ⋅ − + + ⋅ Δ ⋅ − ⋅ =
− ⋅ − ⋅ − − ⋅ − + ⋅ Δ ⋅ − ⋅ = Ψ
b u b u e p b b e p
e p e p e p b b e p
τ ε
ε ε τ ε ε ε
 
where the equality follows by substituting the term 
1
2 / MRS ε −  for  1 ε .    16
A necessary condition for the original schedule to be Pareto-efficient is that 
0 ) , ( 2 1 ≤ ε ε ψ . Otherwise, offering the new schedule will maintain the incentive 
constraints, attain both types the same level of utility as in the original schedules, but 
result in a positive fiscal surplus, which can attain a Pareto improvement. This 
necessary condition implies in particular that:  





1 ≤ − ⋅ − + + ⋅ Δ b u b u e p b b τ . 
Comparing the two necessary conditions (A4) and (A6) yields a contradiction, noting 
that by the claim ) ( ) ( 2
2
2





1 e p e p < , by virtue of the properties of the 
probability function; and,   0 1 ) ( ' / ) ( ' 1 2 > − b u b u  , by virtue of condition (A4). This 
completes the proof. ■ 
 
Proof of the Proposition 




1 b b < . We prove the result for the limiting case of  0 = α . The 
result extends by continuity considerations to the case of sufficiently small α .  








1 τ b b  denote the two Pareto-efficient benefit-tax 
schedules designed for the low-ability individual (type 1) and high-ability individual 
(type 2), respectively. Now consider the following two alternative schedules, denoted 
















1 τ b b , obtained by small perturbations around the original 
schedules, where: 
[] , )] ( 1 [ ) ( ' ) ( ' )] ( 1 [ ) ( ' 2    vi) (
, 0 )] ( 1 [ ) ( ' ) ( '     (v)
, ) ( ' ) ( ' ) ( '    (iv)
, 0   and    0 , 0 , 0 , 0    (iii)
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ε ε ε ε ε
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τ τ ε ε
⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ − = ⋅ − ⋅ −
= ⋅ − ⋅ + ⋅
⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ − −
> < < > <
+ = + = + =
= + = + =
e p b u b u e p w u
e p b u b u
b u b u w u
b b b b
b b b b
   17
where 
i
t e , 1  denotes the optimal effort exerted at time t by type i, when faced with the 
schedule designed for the low-ability individual (type 1). In words, we slightly shift 
the schedule designed for the low-ability individual along her indifference curve in 
the north-west direction, thereby creating a slack in the incentive constraint of the 
high-ability individual; then we use this slack to reduce the utility of the high-ability 
individual (by reducing the benefit levels at both period and by increasing the tax). It 
is easy to observe that the new two schedules satisfy both incentive constraints. 
Moreover, the new schedules imply that the high-ability individual would choose the 
same effort levels (in both periods) as when faced with the original schedule designed 
for her. Finally, the low-ability individual would derive the same level of utility as in 
the original schedule. Differentiating the revenue constraint in (3), employing (iv)-(vi) 
to substitute for  22 21 12 11   and    , , ε ε ε ε , yields, after re-arrangement, the total effect of 
introducing the two new schedules on the net tax revenues as a function of  2 ε , 
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ε ε  
A necessary condition for the original schedules to be Pareto-efficient is that 
0 ) ( 2 ≤ Ξ ε . Otherwise, offering the modified schedules will maintain the two incentive 
constraints, maintain the utility derived by the low-ability individual and result in a 
fiscal surplus, which can be utilized to attain a Pareto improvement (and in particular   18
to raise the utility derived by the low-ability individual). Now let   0 ) (
1
2
1 → Δ b . By 









1 b + τ ) is bounded from above (
1
2
1 b w > −τ , as we assume an interior 
solution for the individual optimization problem). Thus, it follows from (A7), that a 
necessary condition for the original schedule to be Pareto-efficient is that 









1 b b < . This completes the first part of the proof. 




1 b b > . We consider again the limiting case of 
0 = α  (the result then follows by continuity considerations). Our proof will be in two 
steps. First we show that in the Pareto-efficient solution 0
2 > τ . Then we prove that 
provided that  0




1 b b > . Consider first the first step. Suppose, by way of 
contradiction, that  0
2 ≤ τ . By virtue of the revenue constraint in (3) it follows that the 
government obtains expected net revenues (net fiscal surplus) from the low-type 
individual to offset the negative surplus (in expected terms) derived from the high-
ability individual (type 2). In particular,  0
1 > τ . Now suppose that the government 
offers the high-ability individual the same schedule designed for the low-ability 
individual (rather than the presumably Pareto-efficient schedule). That is, the 
government implements a pooling equilibrium, where both types face the schedule 




1 τ b b . It suffices to show that such a modification of the presumably efficient 
schedules results in a fiscal surplus (in expected terms) for the high-ability individual 
as well, to obtain the desired contradiction. The aggregate surplus (from both types) 
may be utilized to attain a Pareto improvement (thereby raising the utility of the low-
ability individual).    19
  To prove that a positive surplus is obtained for the high-ability type, it suffices 
to show that her search effort (hence employment chances) is higher (in each period) 
than that of the low-ability type, when faced with the same schedule. The reason 
being that in such a case, the expected net surplus for the high-ability type would 
exceed that obtained for the low-ability type (which is by presumption strictly 
positive). To see that search efforts of the high-ability type are indeed higher, denote 
by ) , , , ( 2 1 τ b b a et ; t=1,2, the optimal efforts exerted by an individual with ability a, 
faced with a schedule  ) , , ( 2 1 τ b b , in periods 1 and 2, respectively. Consider first the 
second period. Re-formulating the indirect utility given in (1), yields (omitting the tax 
parameters for notational convenience): 
(A8)  [ ] {} ) ( ) ( )] ( [ 1 ) ( )] ( [ ) , , ( 2 2 2 2 2 2 a e b u a e p a w u a e p a b a V − ⋅ ⋅ − + − ⋅ ⋅ ≡ τ τ . 
The first order condition for the individual optimization (with respect to search effort 
in the second period) implies:  
(A9)  0 1 )] ( ) ( [ )] ( [ ' 2 2 = − − − ⋅ ⋅ b u w u a e p a τ .  
Strict concavity of the function p(e) immediately implies that  0 / ) ( 2 > ∂ ∂ a a e .  
We turn next to the first period. Re-formulating the indirect utility given in (1), yields: 
(A10)
[ ] {} ) ( )] , , ( ) ( [ )] ( [ 1 ) ( 2 )] ( [ ) , , , ( 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1 a e b a V b u a e p a w u a e p a b b a V − + ⋅ ⋅ − + − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ ≡ τ τ τ . 
The first order condition for the individual optimization (with respect to search effort 
in the first period) implies:  
(A11)  1 ] , , ( ) ( ) ( 2 [ )] ( [ ' 2 2 1 1 = − − − ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ τ τ b a V b u w u a e p a .  
Fully differentiating the first-order condition in (A11) with respect to a, yields: 
(A12)
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By virtue of the concavity of the probability function p(e), it follows that, 
(A13)  ⎥ ⎦
⎤
⎢ ⎣
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Sign τ . 
Now, substituting from (A8) and (A11) into (A13) and re-arranging, implies that: 
(A14)
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, it suffices to show that: 
(A15)  [] [] []
1
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which holds if-and-only-if, 
(A16)  [] . 0 ) ( )] ( ) ( [ )] ( [ 2 1 )] ( ) ( [ 2 2 2 1 > + − − ⋅ ⋅ − + − − a e b u w u a e p a b u w u τ τ  
By definition of the probability function, it follows that 1 )] ( [ 2 ≤ a e ap . Thus, the 
condition in (A16) follows if  ) ( ) ( 1 2 b u b u > . However, this follows from the first part 
of the proof. We thus yield a contradiction and establish that 0 2 > τ .  




1 b b > . Let the Pareto-efficient 
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1 ' , ' ε ε + = + = b b b b ,  2 1 0 ε ε > > , and 
2
1 2 / MRS = − ε ε . By the same reasoning used in the proof of the lemma, it is easy to 
verify that the perturbed system satisfies the two incentive constraints and hence 
maintains the same level of utility for the low-ability individual. Differentiating the   21
revenue constraint in (3), denoting by  ) , ( 2 1 ε ε Ω  the total effect of the perturbation on 
the net tax revenues, it follows that: 
(A17)
[] , ] 1 ) ( ' / ) ( ' [ )] ( 1 [ ) ( ) ( )] ( 1 [
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where the equality follows by substituting the term 
2
2 / MRS ε −  for  1 ε . 




1 b b ≤  and the strict concavity of the utility 
function, it follows that 0 ) , ( 2 1 > Ω ε ε . Thus, we obtain a fiscal surplus that can attain a 
Pareto improvement. We obtain the desired contradiction. This concludes the proof. ■ 
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Appendix B: Figures 
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